Who Benefits? - Despite Data Breaches, Staff Cuts, Vulnerable Patients' Coverage Cuts, Transplant Program Probation, Multi-Million Dollar Executive Compensation Persists at UPMC

There are so many things wrong with US and global health care that it is easy to get lost in the details, and despair of finding solutions.  Keep in mind, however, that the intractability of many of the problems may be quite man made.  Many problems may persist because the status quo is so beneficial to some people.

The Current Troubles at UPMC

Consider, for example, the troubles that have recently plagued UPMC, the giant health care system in western Pennsylvania.  In the last month, the following reports have appeared.

Electronic Data Breach Affected 2200 Patients

On May 15, the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review reported,

Personal data may have been stolen from more than 2,000 UPMC patients by an employee of an outside company the hospital giant used to handle emergency room billing, the latest in a string of data thefts to hit Pittsburgh health companies.

Note that this was only the most recent data breach at UPMC,

 UPMC was the victim of a data breach last year in which Social Security numbers and other sensitive data from all 62,000 UPMC employees were stolen when thieves hacked into an employee database at the health system.

The confidentiality of patient records is a  major responsibility of health care professionals and hospitals.  Yet UPMC does not seem to be doing a good job in protecting such confidentiality.

UPMC Move to Cut 182,000 "Vulnerable" Elderly Patients from it Medicare Advantage Plan Challenged in Court

The Pittsburgh Business Times reported on May 21,

Health system UPMC will defend its decision to cut 182,000 seniors from its provider network at a Commonwealth Court hearing May 27 in Harrisburg.

The hearing will determine whether UPMC complied with a consent decree that was reached last year and intended to protect 'vulnerable' populations from fallout of the messy Highmark-UPMC divorce. The seniors have Medicare Advantage coverage through UPMC rival Highmark Inc., and most commercial contract relations between the two health care titans ended Dec. 31.

This doesn't sound like the "patient-centered" care UPMC boasts about on its website.

UPMC to Cut 3,500 Staff Via Buyouts

Modern Healthcare reported on May 26,

In Pittsburgh's fiercely competitive healthcare market, UPMC announced voluntary buyouts to reduce its labor costs.

The system—which has also cut its hospital capacity in recent months—offered 3,500 workers voluntary buyouts to 'achieve cost-savings for UPMC by adjusting our workforce to meet the demands of the healthcare marketplace,' said spokeswoman Gloria Kreps.

Not mentioned by UPMC spokespeople were the possible effects on patient care of cutting about 5% of the most experienced members of the UPMC workforce.

UPMC Attorneys Disqualified from Defense of Wrongful Death Case

The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported on May 30,

The law firm that represents UPMC in many civil matter was disqualified from a medical malpractice cast this week after a judge found that an attorney from Dickie, McCarney & Chilcote improperly spoke with and advised a witness.

This does not say a lot for how UPMC managers pick legal counsel and manage their seemingly many legal defenses.

UPMC Lung Transplant Program on Probation, Again

On June 2, the Tribune-Review reported,

A national organ-sharing group has put UPMC's lung transplant program on probation for a year, listing concerns about how the program handled donated organs. 

The United Network for Organ Sharing cited 14 cases in 2013 and 2014 when the hospital system accepted lungs that UPMC doctors later found could not be transplanted in intended recipients, said Dr. Jonathan D'Cunha, UPMC's lung transplantation surgical director.

UPMC kept the organs for other patients in UPMC Presbyterian in Oakland, an approach approved by regional organ procurement groups that supplied the lungs, D'Cunha said. But UNOS, a nonprofit that manages the American organ transplant system, objected to what it called 'an unusually high number of instances' of the practice.

Probation ordered by the board of UNOS and the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network took effect Monday, according to UNOS.

D'Cunha said the transplant program remains fully operational but will be operating under a corrective-action plan.

This was not the first trouble that a UPMC transplant program has encountered.  As the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported,

This is  the second time UPMC has been placed on probation for a transplant problem.

In 2011, it was placed on probation ... after disease was transferred from a living kidney donor to a recipient.

Note that while the first instance of probation seemed to suggest competency issues, the latest one seems to be about ethical issues.  By transplanting kidneys into immediately available UPMC patients who may have lower priorities than other patients on the list, UPMC may be disfavoring patients from "outside," whose transplants, incidentally, would not generate much revenue for UPMC.

An editorial in the Post-Gazette suggested while UPMC "pleads ignorance" about these rules, "Western Pennsylvania's largest hospital network should have known better."

Just Another Bad Month?

Thus it was just another bad month at the office for UPMC management.  But UPMC management has had lots of bad months.  For example, since 2011, we have previously discussed
-  Fantastical musing by the UPMC CEO about health care run by computers, not doctors (look here)
-  Fantastical claims by UPMC in response to a lawsuit that is has no employees (look here)
-  Numerous malpractice cases filed against UPMC related to problems with its electronic medical records (look here, here, here, here)
-  Layoffs at UPMC due to problems with its electronic medical records (look here)
-  A lawsuit by the Mayor of Pittsburgh claiming UPMC should be stripped of its non-profit status (look here).  

The $6.4 Million CEO, and the Other Million Dollar Managers

One would think that these series of events, all in a short time, coupled with all these previous stories, might raise questions about who is running the institution, and what they are being paid.


Instead, however, the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review published a story on May 15, 2015, about just how well paid top UPMC managers continue to be.

UPMC's Jeffrey Romoff banked total compensation of $6.4 million two years ago, ranking the chief executive's pay among the nation's highest for nonprofit health leaders.

The 69-year-old Romoff was one of 31 employees of Western Pennsylvania's largest integrated health system to be paid more than $1 million in 2013,...

Romoff's 2013 pay, which included a base salary of nearly $1 million plus $5 million in incentives and deferred income, was down 3 percent from the previous year but well above the median compensation for a nonprofit hospital CEO.

The defense of Mr Romoff's compensation followed the same pattern we have discussed repeatedly. Justifications for exceedingly generous compensation for health care managers, particularly of non-profit hospital, often are superficial, limited to talking points we have repeatedly discussed, (first  here, with additional examples of their use here, here here, here, here, here, here, and here.)  These are:
- We have to pay competitive rates
  We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive
- Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant (and have to be to do such a difficult job).

So,

UPMC spokeswoman Susan Manko wrote in an email that compensation for the company's executives is tied to performance that is based on 'clearly defined goals, including quality of care, community benefit, financial measures and other key factors.'  Pay takes into consideration what other industry executives are making, she noted.

Thus,, by inference, she implied Mr Romoff's brilliance in meeting the "clearly defined goals," and overtly stressed the competitive rates talking point.

However, the clearly defined goals including putting the transplant on probation twice, having several electronic data breaches, trying to discharge the most experienced employees, being sued for being a non-profit in name only, being subject to numerous malpractice suits, and having one law firm used to defend one of these suits disqualified,  and dumping hundreds of thousands of elderly, "vulnerable" patients?  Really?

A fair comparison was to other overpaid managers, not to the dedicated health care professionals who make the system work?  Really?

Also, as the Pittsburgh-Tribune Review reported on February, 2015, the Chairman of the Board of UPMC, Nicholas Beckwith, thinks Mr Romoff is a

brilliant leader and stood by the board's decision to pay Romoff $6.6 million a year, among the highest CEO salaries for nonprofits in the region.

Furthermore,

'When people ask me about his pay, I say, ‘What would you pay him?'' Beckwith said. 'If they're going to understand the brilliance of Jeffrey Romoff, they have to acknowledge there's no more effective leader in the nation than Jeff Romoff.'

So here was the "brilliance" talking point really writ large.  The most effective leader in the entire US?  Really?

At best, Mr Beckwith seemed to be only thinking about the financial performance of UPMC, rather than its clinical performance, its ethical performance or its effects on patients and their outcomes. But then again, Mr Beckwith might not know much about that,

Beckwith worked as a salesman for Murrysville-based Beckwith Machinery and eventually became its CEO.

But one letter to the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review did suggest

Perhaps UPMC should consider offering buyouts to that group of egotists who inhabit the upper reaches of the U.S. Steel Tower. Then they could move to the next phase of life — old and wealthy.

Summary

So we have presented the recent unpleasantness at UPMC as emblematic of some of the types of unpleasantness that afflict US (and global) health care, including threats to patients' confidentiality and access, problems with quality of health care, possible ethical misconduct, ill treatment of experienced health care staff, etc.  Yet consider that despite these multiple failings, and a history of similar failings going back years, the top hired managers of the non-profit hospital health care system are being made millionaires many times over.  They clearly are benefiting greatly from the current system, regardless of whether the system benefits others.  In fact, one begins to wonder if they are paid well despite the current problems, or because of them?

So one lesson is: every time some new version of health care dysfunction appears in public, think not only about its bad effects on patients, professional values, the public, etc.  Think about who is gaining from the current bad status quo.

 For a slightly more specific lesson....  In a 2014 interview, corporate governance experts Robert Monks and Nell Minow, Monks said,

Chief executive officers' pay is both the symptom and the disease.

Also,

CEO pay is the thermometer. If you have a situation in which, essentially, people pay themselves without reference to history or the value added or to any objective criteria, you have corroboration of... We haven't fundamentally made progress about management being accountable.

The symptom and the disease have metastasized to health care, from huge for-profit corporations now also to even small non-profit hospitals.   Thus, like hired managers in the larger economy, health care managers have become "value extractors."  The opportunity to extract value has become a major driver of managerial decision making.  And this decision making is probably the major reason our health care system is so expensive and inaccessible, and why it provides such mediocre care for so much money. 

One wonders how long the people who actually do the work in health care will suffer the value extraction to continue?
As we have said far too many times - without much impact so far, unfortunately - true health care reform would put in place leadership that understands the health care context, upholds health care professionals' values, and puts patients' and the public's health ahead of extraneous, particularly short-term financial concerns. We need health care governance that holds health care leaders accountable, and ensures their transparency, integrity and honesty.

But this sort of reform would challenge the interests of managers who are getting very rich off the current system.

As Robert Monks also said in the 2014 interview,

People with power are very reluctant to give it up. While all of us recognize the problem, those with the power to change it like things the way they are.

So I am afraid the US may end up going far down this final common pathway before enough people manifest enough strength to make real changes. 

ADDENDUM (16 June, 2015) - This post was re-posted on OpEdNews.com. 

Innovations form the Safra Center Ending iCorruption Conference

I had the pleasure of attending the Ending iCorruption Conference, the capstone conference for the Edmond J Safra Research Lab on Institutional Corruption, held at the Harvard Law School on May 1-2, 2015.  The conference included much material relevant to health care corruption and related topics, and provided some innovative approaches that could be used to address these issues.  I list these below, with citations or links when available.  At some point in the future, all conference proceedings should be available on video from the Safra Center.

Uncovering Data on Conflicts of Interest

Unearth: Using PubMed to Uncover Conflicts of Interest Affecting Clinical Research

Unearth is a browser extension now available for Google Chrome, and soon to become available for other browsers, e.g., Firefox.  It works on PubMed searches, scraping funding and conflict of interest data from the body of articles and adding them to abstracts.  We have often discussed such conflicts of interest, and their relationship to manipulation of clinical research.  Unearth could make such conflicts more salient, making it easier to discriminate unconflicted from conflicted research.  (See this post on the Bill of Health blog.)  This application was developed during the Safra Center Hacking iCorruption Event.

Open Think Tanks: Uncovering Think Tank Funding

Think tanks often publish findings on and make recommendations about health care.  However, think tanks are often opaque, and any institutional conflicts of interest they have may not be easily apparent.  Open Think Tanks currently shows donations from government entities outside the US to US based think tanks.  Enhancements to include various kinds of private donations are likely in the future. This application was also developed during the Hacking iCorruption Event.

Finding Unconflicted Academics

As we have discussed, the majority of medical academics have conflicts of interest, which may affect their research, teaching and patient care.  Yet these conflicts are not always disclosed.  Furthermore, finding experts without conflicts is not easy.  ProfessorCert is a website that allows academics who have no conflicts of interest to register as such.  The website was developed by the Academic Independence Project. 

Improving Integrity

Putting Consumers in the FDA and Other Regulatory Agencies

We have frequently discussed regulatory capture, how government health care regulatory agencies, like the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA),  often seem to end up more concerned about the financial health of those they are supposed to regulate than patients' and the public's health.   Harvard Prof Daniel Carpenter, collaborator in Safra Center research,  talked about the problem of  "cultural capture" of regulatory agencies, in which the regulators' thinking is influenced by outside vested interests.  He proposed that regulatory agencies need to put consumers, or presumably other stakeholders like unconflicted health care professionals, "into the room."  

Putting Ethicists in the C- Suite

We have frequently criticized the leadership of hospitals and hospital systems.  In particular, we have discussed instances in which these leaders seem to have gone directly against the mission of their own organizations, which we termed mission hostile management. Safra Lab Network Fellow James Corbett, now Senior Vice President for Centura Health, proposed that ethicists who also understand the language of finance and management be present among the top leadership of hospital systems.  

Licensing Executives

As noted above, a major theme of the Health Care Renewal blog is the shortcomings of the leadership of large health care organizations.  Top leaders often have business training, but may be ill-informed about health care, and ignorant or unsupportive of  or even hostile to its values.  Wellesley College Professor Emerita Ann Congleton's 2014 article in the Journal of Business Ethics, entitled Beyond business ethics: an agenda for the trustworthy teachers and practitioners of business, proposed requiring that corporate executives, including executives of health care corporations, be licensed in order to lead their organizations.  I proposed licensing of leaders of large health care organizations as early as 2008 (here).    

Pharmaceutical Research Uninfluenced by the Pharmaceutical Industry

Because clinical research meant to evaluate drugs or devices sponsored by  manufacturers of the relevant products has shown to be frequently manipulated, or even suppressed, many people have suggested banning such sponsorship and direct influence of such manufacturers.  (For example, see the book and blog, both entitled "Hooked," written by Dr Howard Brody, and see Health Care Renewal blog posts, e.g., here.)
Safra Center Network Fellow and Rowan University Professor Donald Light's book in press, Good Pharma, basically offers proof of the concept that high quality clinical research on pharmaceuticals can be accomplished without industry money or influence, albeit in Italy, at the Mario Negri Institute. 

Summary

The project on institutional corruption at the Safra Center produced a burst of innovation meant to address this pervasive project, and thus provided much of value to those who want to challenge health care corruption.  I hope this innovation will turn out to be truly disruptive.  It is regretful that this project has come to an end.  We can only hope others pick up the banner.  

The Troubles at Cooper Continue, Lately Gruesomely, But Will Its Leadership and Governance Change This Time? - Part I: Historical Background

Allegations of Murder-Suicide by a Hospital System CEO

This will be a hard series of posts to write. It wa triggered by the latest, and perhaps most gruesome chapter in the troubled history of the leadership of Cooper Health, the largest hospital system in southern New Jersey (known locally as South Jersey).  As reported by the Philadelphia Inquirer on March 28, 2015,

Cooper University Health System CEO John P. Sheridan Jr. stabbed his wife to death, set their bedroom on fire, and then took his own life, authorities have concluded, closing a six-month investigation into the deaths that shocked New Jersey's political and civic communities.

The Somerset County Prosecutor's Office announced its results in a news release Friday, citing forensic evidence and a lengthy probe that included more than 180 interviews.

But it offered no conclusive motive to explain why Sheridan, described by family and friends as mild-mannered, would brutally stab his wife and kill himself.

'Many possible scenarios and theories were considered,' the prosecutor's office said in a statement after months of virtual silence. The evidence 'supports the conclusion that John Sheridan fatally stabbed Joyce Sheridan, set the fire, and committed suicide.'

The Story in Context: a Long History of Leadership and Governance Problems 

We have often discussed bad leadership of health care organizations, and written a lot about the contrast between the munificent compensation paid to non-profit hospital CEOs and the lack of evidence justifying such pay.  However, a murder-suicide allegedly perpetrated by the CEO of a large non-profit hospital system is way at the tail of the curve of questionable managerial behavior.

But it turns out that Cooper Health System has a very long record of leadership and governance troubles.  The current chapter is the latest, and possibly most gruesome, in this sorry series.  However, the context of this history has been lacking in the recent coverage, which has been so far limited to local media.  The history deserves a more complete discussion, and maybe then it could lead to some reconsideration at least of this one institution's leadership and governance, and perhaps the larger troubles in leadership and governance in health care.

Thus this post will summarize the history that I could find up to 2005.  A second post will summarize more recent history up to and through the terrible deaths of John and Joyce Sheridan.  

In the interests of full disclosure, I started my faculty career at what was then Cooper Hospital - University Medical Center, the main teaching hospital for the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ) - Robert Wood Johnson Medical School (RWJMS) branch at Camden, NJ.  During my four years there, 1983-87, I was impressed with the dedication of the physicians, nurses and other health care professionals there.  However, even given my naivete at a young faculty member, the leadership of the institution, which was one of the early adapters of the generic management model,  seemed strange.  Little did I know how strange it was.

In the late 1990s, when I became seriously concerned about what I know call leadership and governance problems in health care, I ran into some folks from South Jersey who told me that Cooper had a tumultuous history since I left.  I got around to researching it, leading to an article in our local American College of Physicians newsletter.  The article, to which I had linked here, is no longer available on the internet.  So I have reposted it below, with some minor modifications, put in square brackets .  Again, the history is of major problems with leadership and governance at Cooper that had inspired no reconsideration by 2005.

The Curiously Quiet Case of Cooper’s Corrupt CFO

Embezzlement by Top Management

    In 1994, two powerful executives at Cooper admitted their guilt in an elaborate embezzlement scheme.  In 1978, John H. Crispo, the owner of Financial Management Corporation Inc., to keep his contract with the hospital, began paying monthly kickbacks of $2500-$10,000 to John M. Sullivan, the Cooper Executive Vice President for Finance.  Sullivan then referred delinquent hospital accounts for collection to a new company Crispo set up.  In turn, Crispo repaid him $340,000 in more kickbacks.  Sullivan recruited Cooper’s Controller, P. John Lashkevich, and the three devised a scheme to defraud the hospital using fabricated bills, established a fictitious company to launder money, and falsified tax returns.  A prosecutor claimed “Mr Sullivan blew this money on wine, women, parties, and a lavish lifestyle,”which included trips with girlfriends to the Plaza Hotel, and jewelry shopping at Tiffany’s.  Sullivan had driven a Porsche, and lived in a $700,000 house.  The conspirators also bought cars, boats, and racehorses.

    Other conspirators were also found and prosecuted.  Helene Weinstein admitted to helping establish a shadow company as a conduit for Sullivan to send money from the hospital to his estranged wife, Elarba Pagan.  Pagan was accused of receiving money sent by Sullivan from Cooper to another firm.  Weinstein testified that Pagan carried “briefcases of cash from the hospital to shop in New York for $1500 shoes.”  Also, Cooper’s Vice President for Finance, Robert Schmid Jr, admitted embezzling money from Cooper to pay for home improvements. Finally, Thomas J. Damadio admitted helping launder up to $600,000 stolen from Cooper, and evading income taxes.  

    Sullivan was sentenced to 55 months in federal prison, Lashkevich, 25, Pagan, eight, Weinstein, three years of probation, Damadio, six months of house arrest.  Crispo died before serving prison time.

The Internal Report, and the Murder Conviction of One of Its Authors

    After these stories became public in 1994, Cooper’s Board of Trustees established a special committee to investigate its financial operations, which included Peter E. Driscoll, Chairman of the Board, Kevin G. Halpern, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and a local Rabbi, Fred Neulander.  The hospital pledged to make its investigation public, but then fought to keep it secret.  Its report was finally released in 1998, after a discovery motion in a civil lawsuit.  Prior to then, the Philadelphia Inquirer had revealed numerous financial conflicts of interest affecting Board members,  including those on the special committee.  For example, Cooper paid the law firm of Archer & Greiner, of which Driscoll was a senior partner, $2.1 million over three years from 1993-96.

    The report revealed that the conspiracy had bilked the hospital of at least $21.8 million from 1987 to 1994, while “Cooper has been the victim of a massive crime wave.”  It stated Sullivan, Lashkevich, and Crispo “had unrestrained and absolute control of virtually all the important financial functions at Cooper and they took full criminal advantage....” It also noted that “employees who became suspicious and questioned the accounting practices or tried to alert management were intimidated, transferred, or dismissed by the high-ranking executives.”  Furthermore, it suggested “the ability to bypass or defeat controls grew from an institutional culture that delegated and outsourced too much responsibility, without developing effective controls....” The report also raised questions about how the internal investigation was conducted.  It noted that Driscoll and Halpern “often locked horns with [the other] committee members....”  Driscoll had objected when other board members called for an independent investigation.  Halpern and Driscoll resigned their positions within days of the forced release of the report.


    One member of the special committee became particularly notorious.  Soon after the internal investigation was set in motion in 1994 Rabbi Neulander’s wife had been murdered.  Soon after, Neulander had failed a polygraph test when questioned about it.  He then resigned his clerical position after his extramarital affairs with members of his congregation were revealed.  In September, 1998, he was charged with hiring the “hit men” who committed the murder.  In 2002, he was convicted  and sentenced to life in prison.

The Aftermath, Financial Woes and Impact on Patient Care

    By 1997, Cooper was in financial trouble, although none of its managers ever admitted a connection to the conspiracy and resulting losses.  However, during a related civil lawsuit, Cooper officials alleged “the hospital’s general operating fund was depleted” by the conspiracy.  Cooper began merger discussions with several partners, including AHERF, although none were ultimately successful. Physicians started leaving in 1997, when all but one full-time cardiologists announced their resignations.  Cooper revealed a $16 million loss for 1998, the largest ever incurred by a New Jersey hospital.  Its bonds were down-graded to junk. The hospital then announced that it would stop accepting uninsured patients for elective treatments, departing from its historic mission of charitable care.  Losses continued in 1999, again totaling $16 million, leading to additional budget cuts.  [CEO Halpern and Chairman of the Board Driscoll resigned within days of each other in 1999, both denying their actions were related to the report.]  By 2000, the hospital had cut its work-force to 3100, from 4000 in early 1999. and had closed various clinical sites and units.  Only thereafter did Cooper began posting budget surpluses.  [By 2002, more physicians quit Cooper en bloc, and the hospital was on its second new CEO since Mr Halpern.]

 The Lurid Stories Remain Anechoic

    The only published reaction to Cooper’s woes came from the related legal proceedings.  The prosecutor in Sullivan’s trial claimed that his thefts were so big that they “threatened the financial stability of the hospital,” and “hurt the image of the city as a whole.”  At Pagan’s sentencing hearing, Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez stated “society could not tolerate a system in which hospital executives ‘rake millions off the top’ that were intended for medical care for the poor.”

    It does seem likely that Cooper’s scandals had major effects on its patient care and academic missions.  Yet, I could find nothing  published about such effects.  Despite the luridness of this case, I also found no reaction from local or national medical groups, from academic organizations, accrediting groups, or government agencies.

Summary

In 2005, I wrote,...  The case of Cooper’s corrupt executives can be viewed as the forerunner to the even more massive bankruptcy of AHERF [Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation, see posts here].  One can only speculate that learning the lessons of the Cooper case could have mitigated the AHERF disaster.  However, as noted in my last article,  the lessons from AHERF are also not widely known.  Yet, as George Santayana wrote, “Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”

As I will address in another post, events at Cooper after 2005 also generated few echoes, up to the latest tragedy.  These events did not suggest much had been learned from the events through 2005. 

So the unfortunate, and sometimes terrible case of Cooper Health has become one of the longest running examples  - starting in 1978 - of the troubles with leadership and governance of large health care organizations, the bad effects of these problems on health care and the values of health care professionals, the lack of public attention to and discussion of these problems and their effects, and the failure of organizations to address on their own their problems with leadership and governance.

True health care reform, as we have said endlessly, requires governance that is accountable, transparent, true to the organization's mission, and honest, ethical, and without conflicts of interest; and leadership that understands health care, upholds its values, is honest, ethical, and without conflicts of interest, is transparent and open, and is willing to be accountable and subject to appropriate incentives. 

References

Embezzlement....

Lewis L. Former official gets jail term for bilking Cooper: John M. Sullivan was sentenced to 55 months - the scheme netted $4 million.  He spent his take lavishly. Philadelphia Inquirer, April 26, 1996.

Graham M. New panel at Cooper plans review: embezzling of $3.8 million by two former top aides and a vendor prompted the study. Philadelphia Inquirer, July 27, 1994.

Lewis L. Ex-hospital executive gets 2 years: he helped steal $4 million from Cooper Hospital - his lawyer said the investigation was going to spread.  Philadelphia Inquirer, November 9, 1996.

Graham M, Turcol T. Inquiry widens into finances at Cooper Hospital: a federal grand jury subpoenaed several officials this month - the inquiry was spurred by testimony from two former Cooper executives indicted for fraud. Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 1996.

Lewis L. Woman admits role in bilking Cooper Hospital. Philadelphia Inquirer, September 6, 1996.

Lewis L. Ex-hospital executive admits theft: Robert Schmid Jr. pleaded guilty to embezzling about $50,000 from Cooper Hospital. Philadelphia Inquirer, September 24, 1996.

Lewis L. More charged in theft at hospital: six people have now been indicted in the embezzlement at the Camden facility. Philadelphia Inquirer, December 12, 1996.

Lewis L. Ex-wife of jailed Cooper Hospital official sentenced in scam: Elarba Pagan bought $1,500 shoes with medical center money, her business partner said. Philadelphia Inquirer, July 2, 1998. P. B5.

Lewis L. Business owner pleads: Thomas J. Damadio said he helped Cooper Hospital executives launder stolen money.  Philadelphia Inquirer, January 18, 1997.

The Internal Report...

Anonymous. Cooper forms committee. PR Newswire, July 26, 1994.

Graham M. FBI is probing Cooper Hospital for violation of securities laws. Philadelphia Inquirer, April 3, 1997.  P. A1.

Hollreiser E. Cooper urged to release audit results. Philadelphia Business Journal, May 30, 1997.

Graham M. Hospital gives state its audit: Cooper complied after the state threatened to withhold funding - the report will be kept secret.  Philadelphia Inquirer, May 14, 1997, P. B1.

Graham M. N.J. finds nothing amiss at Cooper: the Attorney General’s office reviewed an internal hospital audit - no criminal wrongdoing was uncovered. Philadelphia Inquirer, July 11, 1997. P. A1.

Graham M, Cusick F. Listing Cooper’s board deals: companies associated with the hospital’s trustees have gotten some of its largest contracts. Philadelphia Inquirer, June 15, 1997. P. A1.

Anonymous. Report says Rabbi failed polygraph on wife’s death. The (Bergen County) Record, September 5, 1996.

Burney M. Rabbi charged in wife’s killing. Associated Press State & Local Wire, September 10, 1998.

Mulvihill G. Judge declares mistrial in case of Rabbi charged with arranging wife’s murder. Associated Press State & Local Wire, November 13, 2001.

Bell T. Rabbi found guilty of murder in wife’s 1994 death. Associated Press State & Local Wire, November 20, 2002.

Mulvihill G. Jury spares life of rabbi in wife’s murder; faces life in prison.  Associated Press State & Local Wire, November 22, 2002.

The Aftermath...

Uhlman M. Cooper talks with Allegheny: the Camden hospital wants a partner, and the Pa. chain plans a further push into South Jersey. Philadelphia Inquirer, May 20, 1997. P. C1.

Gerlin A. Philadelphia hospital raids New Jersey system’s cardiology staff.  Philadelphia Inquirer, September 27, 1997.

Kastor JA. Governance of Teaching Hospitals: Turmoil at Penn and Hopkins. Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins Press, 2004. P. 41.

Goodman H. As Cooper suffers loss, it says care won’t suffer. Philadelphia Inquirer, February 11, 1999.

Rizzo N. Cooper Hospital announces cuts in staff. Associated Press State & Local Wire, March 18, 1999.

Goodman H. Cooper Health system cuts 103 employees: financial problems were cited - about 400 jobs could be lost this year, and uninsured care will be curtailed. Philadelphia Inquirer, March 19, 1999. P. A1.

Anonymous. As losses mount, Cooper Hospital’s debt rating falls. Associated Press State & Local Wire, April 16, 1999.

Goodman H. Cooper’s debt rating tumbles as losses rise: the 1998 figure is twice as bad as estimated - the poor rating means the hospital must pay more to borrow. Philadelphia Inquirer, April 16, 1999. P. B1.

Kent B. In Camden, a hospital finds itself seriously ill: Cooper, the city’s biggest employer, has ‘heavy losses.’  New York Times, May 9, 1999.

Anonymous.  Cooper Hospital announces more cuts in staff.  Associated Press State & Local Wire, May 20, 1999.

Anonymous.  Camden hospital posts $16 million loss: president sees turnaround.  Associated Press State & Local Wire, February 23, 2000.

Kiely E.  Cooper Hospital to forgo charity-care payments - the state will not reimburse the Camden facility for uninsured patients for four months - the reason: the beleaguered hospital received the money from the state in advance last year.  Philadelphia Inquirer, April 11, 2000. P B1.

Anonymous.  Cooper Hospital president quitting.  Philadelphia Business Journal, January 15, 2002.

Anonymous.  Hospital company sues six departing surgeons.  Associated Press State & Local Wire, July 4, 2002.